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THE ECONOMICS OF (COUNTRY) CHOICE: 
SOUTH KOREA AND AID SELECTIVITY
Catherine B. Smart
Troy University
South Korea has increased its emphasis on aid outflows since it joined the Organi-
sation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Although it aligns its 
aid program with most of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
requirements, such as poverty reduction, South Korea diverges from the DAC 
model in significant areas. One of the most evident differentiations between South 
Korean aid practices and DAC norms is the ROK’s decision to provide the largest 
share of its aid allocations to lower-middle income countries (LMIC), rather than 
least developed countries. This paper illustrates that South Korea’s preference for 
LMICs is a function of its aid relationship with the DPRK (Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, also North Korea), the ROK’s perception of itself as an inter-
national actor, an emphasis on economic and regional relationships and its own 
development history.
Introduction
In the past fifteen years, South Korea has mounted a concerted effort to grow 
and legitimize its aid program. It has shifted from fundamentally mercantilist 
aid practices1 toward a more internationalist focus on poverty reduction, en-
vironmentally conscious development and international cooperation.2 Despite 
the stated goals of its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) program, an 
examination of South Korean practices shows that the lion’s share of the coun-
try’s aid is allocated to lower middle-income countries (LMIC) rather than to 
the least developed countries (LDC).3 The disparity between its stated goals and 
1 Mercantilist aid practices are defined as practices with primary economic benefit for the donor na-
tion, e.g. by establishing or fostering favorable trade relationships, in order to enhance that country’s econom-
ic competitiveness. Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic 
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 157.
2 “Korea’s ODA at a glance: Striving Forward to Eradicate International Poverty,” MOFAT, ODA 
Korea, http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng/include/glance.php (accessed February 26, 2011).
3 An LDC is defined by the World Bank as a state with a GNI per capita income of less than dol-
lars996 (2009 standards). “Country and Lending Groups,” The World Bank Group, http://data.worldbank.org/
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extant practice leads one to ask why South Korea does not focus more of its 
aid program toward LDCs. This paper seeks to demonstrate that South Korea’s 
preference for aid allocations to LMICs is owed to five often interrelated fac-
tors: the country’s aid relationship to North Korea, South Korea’s perception of 
itself as an international actor, an emphasis on economic and regional relation-
ships and its own development history.
Theoretical Framework and Terms
This paper situates Korea’s selection of aid recipients within the recent shift in 
traditional aid priorities, from an emphasis on economic growth as a driver of 
development to a focus on poverty reduction.4 Contemporary texts in the field 
of aid selectivity tend to be comprised of either analyses of why donors select 
particular countries as recipients of ODA,5 or why donor countries should select 
particular types of state aid recipients, such as LDCs.6 A growing body of litera-
ture examines the differentiation between traditional and more emergent donors 
in an attempt to explicate changes in the prevailing culture of the aid regime.7 
Using the Center for Global Development’s (CGD) contention that aid to the 
poorest countries is more likely to reduce poverty than aid to wealthier states as 
a base assumption renders South Korea’s choice to provide aid to countries with 
about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Lower_middle_income (accessed February 27, 
2011); Hisahiro Kondoh et al., “Diversity and Transformation of Aid Patterns in Asia’s ‘Emerging Donors,’” 
JICA-RI Working Paper. Impact of Non-DAC Donors in Asia: A Recipient’s Perspective, October 2010: 21; 
Alf Morten Jerve and Hilde Selbervik, “Self-Interest and Global Responsibility: Aid Policies of South Korea 
and India in the Making,” Chr. Michelsen Institute, September 2009: 12.
4 Paul Mosley, John Hudson, and Arjan Verschoor, “Aid, Poverty Reduction, and the ‘New Condi-
tionality,’” The Economic Journal 114, no. 496 (June 2004): 217.
5 See Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,” Journal of 
Economic Growth 5 (March 2000): 33-63; James H. Lebovic, “Donor Positioning: Development Assistance 
from the US, Japan, France, Germany, and Britain,” Political Research Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 2005): 
119-26.
6 See David Roodman, “An Index of Donor Performance,” Vers. Working Paper Number 67. Center 
for Global Development, October 2009, http://www.cgdev.org/doc/CDI/2009/Aid_2009.pdf (accessed Febru-
ary 20, 2010); Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possiblities for Our Time (New York: Penguin 
Group, 2005).
7 See Ngaire Woods, “Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolu-
tion in development assistance,” International Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008): 1-17; Hisahiro Kondoh et al., “Di-
versity and Transformation of Aid Patterns in Asia’s ‘Emerging Donors’” JICA-RI Working Paper. Impact 
of Non-DAC Donors in Asia: A Recipient’s Perspective, October 2010. (accessed February 20, 2011); Alf 
Morten Jerve and Hilde Selbervik, “Self-Interest and Global Responsibility: Aid Policies of South Korea 
and India in the Making,” Chr. Michelsen Institute. September 2009; Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, “Aid, 
Poverty Reduction, and the ‘New Conditionality,’” 217-243.
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incomes well above the LDC level worthy of closer examination.8 This paper 
defines aid and ODA interchangeably as official donations (grants and govern-
ment loans) to countries and multilateral organizations on the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) list of ODA beneficiaries. For aid to qualify as ODA, its 
primary goal must be to increase economic development and well-being in re-
cipient countries; also, flows must be considered concessional (encompassing a 
minimum of 25% grants).9 Because binary associations are more readily indica-
tive of a country’s aid selectivity, this analysis is limited to an examination of 
South Korea’s bilateral ODA relationships.
 Traditional donors, defined as the members of the DAC, have devel-
oped an aid regime over the past 60 years that exercises increasing influence on 
donor aid practices. The mutually constitutive norms include the emphasis on 
the increasing quantity of aid as well as “poverty reduction, aid effectiveness 
and harmonization.”10 The DAC model of aid is reinforced by documents such 
as the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Recommendations 
on Terms and Conditions of Aid,11 the latter of which emphasizes efforts in sup-
port of LDCs. In contrast, emerging donors have introduced variations to the 
DAC orthodoxy on aid giving.12 Donors such as China, India and South Korea 
maintain that growth is best achieved through a package of aid, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and trade.13
 
The ROK Aid Model
Within this analytical framework, the ROK aid program manifests features of 
both DAC priorities and emerging donor reluctance to conform to aid regime 
norms.14 As with many post-conflict states, Korea received massive amounts of 
8 Roodman, “An Index of Donor Performance,” 16.
9 “Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage,” OECD, http://www.oecd.org/docu
ment/4/0,3746,en_2649_34447_46181892_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed March 1, 2011).
10 Kondoh et al., “Asia’s Emerging Donors,” 6.
11 OECD, “Development Co-Operation of the Republic of Korea: A DAC Special Review,” OECD 
Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC), August 8, 2008: 18, http://www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/53/50/42347329.pdf (accessed February 27, 2011).
12 Kondoh defines non-DAC donors as those whose “… substantial influence and importance in 
the international community […] is emerging,” rather than as a temporal assessment. Kondoh et al., “Asia’s 
Emerging Donors,” 18.
13 Sato, Jin, Hiroaki Shiga, Takaaki Kobayashi, and Hisahiro Kondoh, “How do ‘Emerging’ Donors 
Differ from ‘Traditional’ Donors? An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia,” 12th Annual Con-
ference of GDN, Bogota, 2011, 7.
14 Kondoh et al., “Asia’s Emerging Donors,” 23.
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foreign aid following the Korean War. Contrary to initial expectations, Korea 
prospered. A significant indicator of Korea’s development success is that the 
country became a net donor of foreign aid by 1995, the year that the country was 
removed from the World Bank lending list (Table 1). In 1996, Korea joined the 
OECD and became a net donor of aid the next year. The country’s consistent per 
capita growth led the OECD’s DAC to move Korea to the more developed Part 
II of its List of Aid Recipients. Korea was removed from the list completely in 
2005 and was accepted as a member of the DAC in 2009.15
 The ROK aid program is managed by two separate agencies. The Eco-
nomic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), operated by the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance (MOSF), is responsible for concession loans and interstate 
economic cooperation. The Korea
Figure 1: Republic of Korea Net ODA, 1960-200416
International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), under the aegis of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), manages grants with emphasis primarily 
on poverty reduction and humanitarian relief.17 At 0.10%, South Korea’s ODA/
15 “OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Welcomes Korean Membership,” Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2009, http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3343,
en_2649_33721_44141618_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed February 26, 2011).
16 World Bank Group, 2010
17 “ODA Korea,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng/introduc-
tion/grants.php (accessed February 19, 2011).
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GNI ratio is relatively low in comparison to the DAC average of 0.31%.18 Korea 
intends to increase its ODA program to align with the United Nations’ Millen-
nium Development Goals of 0.1% of ODA/GNI by 2010 and 0.25% by 2015.19
 The largest portion of South Korea’s outward ODA is targeted toward 
regional recipients. More than 68% of ECDF disbursements and 32% of KOI-
CA’s aid budget are allocated to Asian states.20 The relative share of Korean aid 
to Asian states has diminished considerably in the past decade, dropping from 
74% in 2002 to 41% in 2006. The decline in aid to Asia took place in the con-
text of rising levels of aid to the Middle East during the Iraq War, as well as a 
deliberate shift toward Africa in Korean ODA policy. As a result, South Korean 
aid distributions to Africa rose 10% between 2002 and 2006 to 12.7%.21
Figure 2: Bilateral ODA by Income Group (Total Net ODA 2006)22
 
 Perhaps the most surprising feature of South Korea’s aid program is 
the country’s selection of recipients. Korea allocates roughly one quarter of its 
ODA budget to LDCs. However, its aid allocations to Lower Middle-Income 
Countries (LMIC) were nearly twice as high, comprising just under half of Ko-
rea’s entire aid budget.23 As Table 2 illustrates, these numbers clearly demon-
18 “Net Official Development Assistance in 2009,” OECD, http://www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/17/9/44981892.pdf (accessed February 27, 2011).
19 “ODA Korea,” MOFAT.
20 EDCF, “EDCF Annual Report 2007,” EDCF, 2008, http://www.edcfkorea.go.kr/eng/publications/
report.jsp?st_code=5&nd_code=1 (accessed February 26, 2011):3; KOICA, “2007 Annual Report,” 2008, 
http://www.koica.go.kr/img/pdf/2008annual_e.pdf (accessed February 25, 2011), 11.
21 “ODA Korea,” MOFAT.
22 KOICA 2008
23 An LMIC is defined by the World Bank as a state with a 2009 GNI per capita income of 996-
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strate that South korea’s choice to send aid to LMICs diverges from the DAC 
norm and policy of poverty reduction.24
Explanatory factors
South Korea’s ODA program is most heavily influenced by its particular set of 
internal circumstances. Of the myriad reasons that explain Korea’s lack of aid 
to LDCs, pride of place must be accorded to the country’s complex relationship 
with the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, also North Korea). By 
most measurements of development (including
Figure 3: ROK aid to the DPRK25
 
income, human development and economic efficiency), the DPRK is consid-
ered to be an LDC.26 While grant and food aid to the DPRK has essentially 
terminated since the inauguration of conservative President Lee Myung-Bak, 
3,945 dollars. World Bank Group, “Country and Lending Groups,” The World Bank Group, 2011, http://data.
worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Lower_middle_income (accessed 
February 27, 2011).
24 Roodman, “Donor Performance,” 19-20.
25 Ministry of Unification 2010
26 Choong Yong Ahn (ed), North Korea Development Report 2002/03 (Seoul: Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy, 2003), 46-51; World Bank Group, “Country and Lending Groups,” The 
World Bank Group, 2011, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-
groups#Lower_middle_income (accessed February 27, 2011).
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South Korea has been a major donor to its impoverished northern neighbor for 
the entirety of its OECD membership. As Table 3 demonstrates, South Korea 
has provided aid (in the form of food, grants, loans, expertise and supplies in 
agricultural and medical fields) to the DPRK since 1995.27
 South Korea defines its state territorial jurisdiction as encompassing the 
entire peninsula, categorizing its economic interactions with the DPRK as do-
mestic affairs to be handled by the Ministry of Unification rather than through 
trade or finance ministries. Therefore, because South Korea does not consider 
its expenditures for the DPRK as external, its aid to North Korea is not classi-
fied as ODA according to the DAC definition.28 An assessment of 2007 South 
Korean external ODA flows that incorporates aid to North Korea would alter the 
former’s aid allocations to $1.2 billion, increasing its ODA/GNI percentage to 
0.11%. Furthermore, inclusion of aid to the DPRK in its total allocations raises 
South Korea’s share of aid to LDCs to 44.39%. The importance that South Ko-
rea confers on its aid efforts to the DPRK is also evidenced by the increasing aid 
quantities South Korea dedicates to the Philippines, which is home to a growing 
number of DPRK refugees.29 Assessing aid volumes as a function of both inter-
national and, in this case, uniquely domestic conditions, offers a truer picture of 
South Korea’s aid to LDCs and its commitment to poverty reduction.
 The second reason that explains the selectivity of Korea’s aid program 
is the country’s desire to define itself as a middle power. Korea is acutely aware 
of its image in the world and has set itself the challenging goal to, “…commen-
surate with its economic capacity…seek to enhance its role and standing as a re-
sponsible member of the international community.”30 South Korea consistently 
seeks to increase its global standing through the successful application of soft 
power, such as campaigns to host high profile international events in a variety 
of fields. Korea’s bid to secure the 1988 Olympic Games served as the opening 
salvo of efforts to raise the country’s global image through international athletic 
competitions.31 Subsequent sports-as-diplomacy events include the 2002 FIFA 
World Cup and the upcoming 2011 International Association of Athletics Fed-
27 Ministry of Unification, “Humanitarian Cooperation,” Inter-Korean Affairs, June 2010, http://eng.
unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFhumanitarian_assistance (accessed February 25, 2011).
28 MOFAT, “ODA Korea.”
29 World Bank Group, “Country and Lending Groups;” Kondoh et al., “Asia’s Emerging Donors,” 
44.
30 “MOFAT Policy Statement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010, http://www.mofat.
go.kr/english/political/tasks/index.jsp (accessed February 23, 2011).
31 Jarol B. Manheim, “Rites of Passage: The 1988 Seoul Olympics as Public Diplomacy,” The West-
ern Political Quarterly 43, no. 2 (1990): 281-2.
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erations World Championships in Daegu.32
 Far more indicative of an evolving South Korean engagement to am-
plify its weight in the international community are its efforts in the economic 
realm, which include increasing its importance as an aid donor. South Korea 
joined the World Trade Organization in 1995,33 coincidentally the last year the 
country was a net recipient of ODA (Table 1). South Korea joined the OECD in 
1996 and subsequently launched a lengthy and ultimately successful campaign 
to join the OECD DAC. Korea’s influence in global economic matters was fur-
ther validated when the 2010 G20 summit was held in Seoul.
 Within this framework, however, South Korea is extremely cognizant 
of its limited choice of geopolitical options. It is resource poor, which makes 
it highly trade dependent and necessitates a deft touch in international mat-
ters. Moreover, although the relationship is often fractious, the alliance between 
South Korea and the United States looms large in the former’s foreign policy. Its 
strategic importance to the global superpower imposes restraints on South Ko-
rea’s independent political alternatives. Accordingly, South Korea takes care to 
define its influence in economic terms rather than in political or military ones.34 
Korea’s pursuit of a “middle way” has been highly successful. As Ambassador 
of the Permanent Delegation of Korea to the OECD Hur Kyung-Wook stated at 
the Global Korea 2011 Symposium, “Nobody is afraid of Korea’s rise.”35
 The establishment of South Korea’s ODA program is a continuation of 
its strategy to brand itself as a middle power. In fact, Korea’s prime motivation 
for its aid program is a desire to increase its global influence.36 The achievement 
of this goal is limited by the inconsistency between Korea’s desire to increase its 
standing and the relatively small size of its ODA allocations, which has earned 
the country no small share of disapproval.37 Despite such exhortations, a sig-
nificant increase in Korea’s ODA budget has not materialized. Moreover, if one 
considers that aid allocations to the DPRK virtually ceased in 2007, the Korean 
ODA program appears to be stagnating. 
 Korea’s aid program reflects the nascence of its self-perceived iden-
32 “IAAF World Championships Daegu 2011,” International Association of Athletics Federation, 
1996-2009, http://www.iaaf.org/wch11/index.html (accessed February 18, 2011).
33 “Trade Profile: Korea, Republic of,” WTO, 2009, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCoun-
tryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=KR (accessed February 26, 2011).
34 Jerve and Selbervik, “South Korea and India,” 62.
35 Kyung-Wook Hur, “East Asia in a Reshaping World Order and the Role of Korea,” Paper pre-
sented at the Global Korea 2011 Symposium, Seoul, Korea, February 24, 2011.
36 Jerve and Selbervik, “South Korea and India,” 2.
37 United Nations Radio, “Ban Ki-moon met South Korea’s Leaders in Seoul,” United Nations Ra-
dio, July 7, 2008, http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/36559.html  (accessed March 1, 2011).
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tity. South Korea donates small quantities of ODA, but to a large number of 
recipients. This wealth spreading indicates the aspiration to maximizethe influ-
ence associated with being an aid donor despite the limitations associated with 
a diminutive aid budget.38 Similarly, the South Korean selection of generally 
wealthier aid recipient countries reflects its desire to establish beneficial eco-
nomic partnerships rather than establish itself as a leader in the ODA field. For 
South Korea’s purposes, up to this point the fact itself that it was a donor coun-
try was the important part. In sum, Korea’s experience as an influential donor 
is inchoate and not yet developed to the degree that aid effectiveness (e.g., aid 
targeted toward DAC norms) is as important a policy goal as aid per se.
 Third, as the previous section suggests, maintaining an economic rela-
tionship with aid recipients is important to South Korea. From the outset of its 
aid program, Korea has used ODA as a tool to secure resources by establishing 
bilateral aid, trade and investment relationships with developing countries.39 
Korea unmistakably considers future business relationships when selecting 
recipients for ODA.40 Therefore, the establishment of reciprocal economic ar-
rangements is an important facet of the South Korean aid strategy.41 As late as 
2008, 98% of South Korea’s aid remained tied, a conditionality that requires 
recipients to use received loans and grants toward purchasing Korean products 
and services. Additionally, the fact that Korea views giving aid to a country as 
a precursor to a future economic relationship is borne out by the robust linkage 
between Korean ODA and FDI.42
 South Korea’s emphasis on beneficial economic liaisons leads it to de-
vote attention to states that are developed enough to support its brand of indus-
trialization-fueled growth. This attention extends to South Korea’s aid program 
as well. Evidence that Korea sees LMICs as beneficial trade partners is found 
in the narrowing of its aid program to emphasize relationships with “priority 
partner” states. Although the reduction of aid recipient countries is taking place 
ostensibly in an effort to provide a clearer focus for, and more effective distribu-
tion of, Korean ODA, it is impossible to overlook the dearth of the poorest na-
tions among the revised list. Of the 19 states that Korea has identified as priority 
38 Alesina and Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid,” 42.
39 Jerve and Selbervik, “South Korea and India,” 8, 19.
40 Eun Mee Kim and Jai S. Mah, “Patterns of South Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment Flows into 
China,” Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (December 2006): 897.
41 EDCF, “Annual Report 2007,” 7.
42 Bokyeong Park and Hong Sik Lee, Does Korea Follow Japan in Foreign Aid? Relationships be-
tween Aid and Foreign Investment, Working Paper Series Vol. 2008-08, The International Centre for the Study 
of East Asian Development, Kitakyushu, Japan, 2008: 19.
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partners, 13 are LMICs.43
 The self-interested character of South Korean ODA also keeps with 
academic literature on the subject of donor aid allocation. According to Alesina 
and Dollar, the strategic interests of the donor country feature prominently in 
decisions to allocate aid.44 These interests also include economic considerations. 
Additionally, there is some theoretical support that favors trade relationships 
over aid.45 These views lend some credibility to South Korean aid practices. 
 Despite empirical support which demonstrates that Korea’s nationalist 
ODA practices are not unusual, the mercantilist tenor of its aid program has 
not gone unnoticed by the international community. In addition to United Na-
tions Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s call for South Korea to increase its aid 
volume and assume more leadership in the field of ODA issues, international 
academics, journalists and leaders publicly encourage Korea to take on greater 
responsibility.46 As President of the French Institute of International Relations 
Thierry de Montbrial insists, “(…) as a medium-sized power (South Korea)…
can, and has, the will and the readiness to contribute resources. South Korea is 
in a prime position to play an increased role.”47 Although more recent Korean 
aid agency documents reflect an awareness of DAC priorities of aid effective-
ness, poverty reduction and sustainable development, the process of change has 
been slow.48
 Closely related to the economic relationships is the fourth factor that 
influences Korea’s choice of aid recipients: the regional focus of its aid program 
(Table 4). This regional emphasis owes much to the significance that South Ko-
rea attaches to its role in Asia. 
43 The 13 LMICs are Angola, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, Mongolia, Pakistan, Paraguay, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen. OECD, “Korea: A DAC Special Review,” 11; World 
Bank Group, “Country and Lending Groups.”
44 Alesina and Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid?,” 47.
45 However, trade in the latter analysis is posited as open. Christopher S. Adam and Stephen A. 
O’Connell, “Aid versus Trade Revisited: Donor and Recipient Policies in the Presence of Learning-by-Do-
ing,” The Economic Journal 114, no. 492 (January 2004): 169.
46 OECD, “Development Co-Operation of the Republic of Korea.”
47 Thierry de Montbrial, “East Asia in a Reshaping World Order and the Role of Korea” (paper pre-
sented at the Global Korea 2011 symposium, Seoul, Korea, February 24, 2011).
48 MOFAT, “ODA Korea.”
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Figure 4. Bilateral ODA by region (Total Net, 2006)49
                          
In addition to its aspiration for recognition as a global player, South Korea con-
tinues to pursue opportunities to display its economic prowess in regional af-
fairs as well. South Korea increasingly defines itself as part of an East Asian 
economic bloc, seeking to capitalize on the growing significance of the region 
in the world economy.50 An increased Asian regional identity carved from a 
similarity of development experiences and setbacks and enhanced by trade or-
ganizations and multilateral lending is often presented as an alternative to exter-
nal (western) influence. As one of the strongest economies in the region, South 
Korea aims to position itself as a leading actor within the framework of rising 
Asian influence.51
 The heavy concentration of South Korean aid in Asia is closely related 
to high regional trade interdependence and volume.52 In other words, Asia is the 
locus for a sizeable portion of South Korea’s economic activities. The regional 
focus of South Korea’s international relationships is readily evident in its trade 
data. East Asian countries (Japan and China) comprise approximately one third 
of Korea’s imports and exports.53 The influence of Korea’s regional economic 
relationships manifests itself even more strongly in the trade statistics of the 
country’s Asian economic partners. Behind China and Japan, South Korea is 
generally the third or fourth largest trade partner of most East Asian states.54
49 KOICA 2008
50 Hur, “East Asia in a Reshaping World Order.”
51 “East Asia in the World: Prospects and Challenges,” Global Korea 2011, Seoul: KIEP, 2011, 
1-111.
52 Kondoh et al., “Asia’s Emerging Donors,” 22.
53 WTO, “Trade Profile: Korea, Republic of.”
54 Christopher M. Dent, East Asian Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 2008), 44.
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 Outward flows of Korean FDI also indicate strong regional attach-
ments. According to UNCTAD assessments, in 2000 Korea invested more than 
40% of its FDI to the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia—each of which is an 
ASEAN LMIC with whom South Korea also has a significant aid relationship.55 
Although China has supplanted ASEAN countries as the primary destination of 
South Korean FDI in the last decade, South Korea’s investment in East Asian 
states continues to grow. 
 Largely because of its East Asian economic relationships, South Korea 
has focused its aid donor program on regional development projects.56 These 
ventures are undertaken both bilaterally and in cooperation with multilateral or-
ganizations such as the OECD and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Much 
of this aid involves infrastructure development projects in the Greater Mekong 
Sub-region. To that end, Korea has signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the ADB and offered loans to Vietnam.57
 Aid practices, combined with the volume of trade between South Korea 
and its Asian neighbors, support the assertion that Korea applies its economic 
influence to enhance its standing as a regional economic power by interact-
ing most with more developed LMICs rather than impoverished states.58 Asian 
LMICs that receive ODA from South Korea include Mongolia, Vietnam, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan, the Philippines and Indonesia.59 An examination of Korean out-
ward ODA recipients by agency indicates that two of the four highest disburse-
ments of EDCF loans are Asian (Sri Lanka and the Philippines, both LMICs). 
Similarly, KOICA reports reveal that Iraq (an LMIC) has received the highest 
percentage of aid (17.3% of the agency’s total budget in 2007) since 2003. Four 
of the next top five KOICA aid recipient countries are Asian: Sri Lanka, Viet-
nam, Indonesia and Cambodia. Of these, all but Cambodia are LMICs.60
 Finally, while the preceding four factors might lead to the perception 
that South Korea’s ODA program is motivated solely by self-interest, one must 
also consider the importance of South Korea’s own experience as an aid recipi-
ent in its assumptions about development. As this paper has discussed, South 
Korea experienced rapid development in significant areas. Indeed, South Ko-
55 Kim and Mah, “Patterns of Korea’s FDI to China,” 895; Kondoh et al., “Asia’s Emerging Donors,” 
21.
56 EDCF, “Annual Report 2007,” 10, 13-14; KOICA, “Annual Report 2007,” 18.
57 “Korea, Australia and ADB Provide $1.65M for Viet Nam, Cambodia Road Improvements,” Asian 
Development Bank, 2007, http://www.adb.org/media/articles/2007/12307-mekong-roads-improvements/de-
fault.asp?p=vienews (accessed February 26, 2011).
58 WTO, “Trade Profile: Korea, Republic of.”
59 World Bank Group, “Country and Lending Groups.”
60 EDCF, “Annual Report 2007,” 14; KOICA, “Annual Report 2007,”19-24.
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rea’s transition from indebted postwar country to economic powerhouse has 
been the topic of considerable scholarly debate. As a result, it sees its model 
as one that can be utilized by other developing states.61 South Korea aims to 
employ “…its limited financial resources effectively in areas where Korea has a 
comparative advantage,” emphasizing its “…unique experience of developing 
from one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the most economically 
advanced.”62
 In keeping with contentions that economic growth is necessary for 
development,63 the ROK has built its aid program on the premise that progress 
in all areas obtains from industrialization. The South Korean exemplar lends 
considerable credence to this line of reasoning. The expansion of the Korean 
economy was accompanied by a concomitant rise in a number of human de-
velopment indicators, such as income equality.64 Among its contemporary late 
industrializing states, South Korea stands out as a remarkable success story. 
The South Korean trajectory of development based on rapid industrialization 
therefore serves as the cornerstone of its own machinations as an aid donor. The 
Korean belief in the efficacy of its development history translates to an empha-
sis on loans and infrastructure building in its aid (and investment) practices, as 
these elements were key to its own rapid economic growth. South Korea also 
underscores a tripartite combination of aid, trade and investment in the structure 
of its ODA agenda.65
 That South Korea’s ODA program has evolved in many ways to repli-
cate its own development experience also contributes to the tendency to direct 
its efforts toward countries that possess adequate initial conditions in their soci-
eties and state structures. Differently stated, South Korea seeks to establish rela-
tionships with states that resemble its own early years of development. Suitable 
state characteristics include inter alia higher urbanization levels and a more de-
veloped middle class.66 Korea’s preference for advantageous preconditions for 
its aid selection is borne out by Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan’s assessment 
61 EDCF, “Annual Report 2007,” 4. 
62 “Our Mission: Making a Better World Together,” KOICA, 2008. http://www.koica.go.kr/ (ac-
cessed February 28, 2011).
63 Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Pe-
riphery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2-3.
64 Gary Gereffi, “Rethinking Development Theory: Insights from East Asia and Latin America,” 
Sociological Forum 4, no. 4 (1989): 506.
65 Alf Morton Jerve, “Asian Models for Aid: Is There a Non-Western Approach to Development As-
sistance?” CMI Report 2007:12, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Oslo, 2007: 7.
66 Dani Rodrik, Gene Grossman and Victor Norman, “Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea 
and Taiwan Grew Rich,” Economic Policy 10, no. 20 (April 1995): 75-7.
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that improved recipient state capacity results in higher aid contributions.67 It is 
thus not surprising that South Korea seeks to invest in relatively more devel-
oped LMICs. 
Comparative Aid Selectivity
The relative newness of Korea’s experience as an aid donor, combined with the 
evident endorsement of its progress by the OECD DAC, leads one to question 
whether South Korea is unique among emerging donors, particularly in Asia. 
Korea touts its status as the first country to move from the ODA recipient list 
to membership in the DAC andonly the secondAsian country ever to become a 
member.68 The visibility of the South Korean aid program is undoubtedly high 
when weighed against emerging donors, as is the country’s public embrace-
ment of DAC norms. Nevertheless, Korea is relatively overt about expressing 
its desire to gain from economic linkages as part of its ODA strategy.69 While 
the behaviors of other emerging donors are less explicitly self-interested, many 
such states also seek economic and geopolitical advantages from their ODA 
practices. For example, India ties its aid program to its foreign policy priori-
ties by seeking to establish beneficial relationships with its neighbors.70 China 
places considerable value on trade and investment as part of its development 
package.71 The aid strategies of each of these states bear resemblance to South 
Korea’s own ODA program. 
 Similarities to Korea’s pursuit of national interests are not only found 
among emerging donors but they are also visible in established DAC country 
ODA practices. Despite the harmonization efforts proclaimed by the Paris Dec-
laration, traditional donors continue to pursue self-interested goals through their 
aid programs as well. Lebovic makes a strong case that Great Britain, France 
and Germany respectively emphasize economic concerns and trade partnerships 
in the formation of their aid donation programs.72 Furthermore, the ROK’s dis-
67 Glenn Palmer, Scott B. Wohlander and T. Clifton Morgan, “Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign 
Policy Sustainability,” Journal of Peace Research (2002): 23.
68 MOFAT, “Korea’s Accession to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC),” MOFAT, 
November 30, 2009, http://news.mofat.go.kr/enewspaper/articleview.php?master=&aid=2493&ssid=23&mv
id=722 (accessed March 1, 2011); “EDCF Policy,” EDCF, 2010, Korea’s Accession to the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) (accessed March 1, 2011).
69 EDCF, “Annual Report 2007,” 10.
70 Jerve and Selbervik, “South Korea and India,” 9.
71 Ngaire Woods, “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolu-
tion in Development Assistance,” International Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008): 11.
72 James H. Lebovic, “Donor Positioning: Development Assistance from the US, Japan, France, 
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tribution of a small aid budget across a substantial number of recipients bears 
similarities to the ODA programs of Australia and Italy.73
 The aforementioned comparisons notwithstanding, the greatest parallel 
in Korea’s aid program choices (including its selection of recipient countries) is 
found in the example of Japan during the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, 
the Japanese aid model was shaped “…primarily by economic considerations 
and alliance maintenance.”74 South Korea’s prioritization of trade, its simultane-
ously beneficial and conflicted relationship with the US, as well as its regional 
affiliations indicate striking parallels to the Japanese experience of recent dec-
ades. Most importantly, Japan devoted the largest quantity of its ODA budget 
to LMICs. In 1985-1986, for example, the share of Japanese ODA devoted to 
LMICs was 53%, while the portion dedicated to LDCs was 21%. Korea’s aver-
age data for 2002-2006 are nearly identical for its country income allocations: 
52% to LMICs and 24% to LDCs. During this latter period, Japan liberalized its 
aid regime to bring the program somewhat more in alignment with DAC aver-
ages, decreasing its aid percentages to LMICS to 39%. Although the reduction 
was not accompanied by a contemporaneous rise in aid allocations to LDCs,75 
Japan serves here as the best example of a future road map for South Korea to 
follow in order to increase the effectiveness (e.g. poverty reduction efforts) of 
its aid program.
Conclusion
Since it became an aid donor in 1987, South Korea’s selection of recipients has 
been based principally on the criterion of economic advantage. The country’s 
prioritization of beneficial economic relationships in its aid allocations supports 
the theory that the perceived strategic value of the recipient state is the deci-
sive factor governing aid distribution.76 Recently, South Korea has shifted the 
focus of its ODA program toward more humanitarian goals, which is likely 
to result in a movement toward DAC norms such as poverty reduction. Korea 
has the opportunity to bring further international focus to its aid practices in 
Germany, and Britain,” Political Research Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 2005): 123.
73 Roodman, “Donor Performance,” 3.
74 Richard Grant and Jan Nijman, “Historical Changes in US and Japanese Foreign Aid to the Asia-
Pacific Region,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers (1997): 36.
75 Japanese ODA to LDCs dropped 5 percentage points to 16%. Park and Lee,“Does Korea Follow 
Japan?” 4, 24.
76 Stephen Kosack and Jennifer Tobin, “Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid, 
FDI and the Government in Economic Success,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 224.
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2011, when the OECD’s Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness will 
take place in Pusan.77 However, a combination of domestic constraints (a con-
servative administration, conflicting goals of its internal aid agencies and the 
disproportionately large influence of big businesses) and international factors 
(the 2008 economic downturnand an increased sense of East Asian regionalism) 
will likely result in a continuation of the same selectivity trends in South Korean 
outward ODA for the near future. 
 Ultimately, Korea’s rise in economic stature will not come without as-
sociated responsibilities. This includes increased leadership as an aid donor. 
The traditional aid model faces considerable competition from emerging do-
nors, particularly in Asia. Among these newly influential donors, South Korea 
is uniquely situated both financially and experientially to effect change in the 
traditional modus operandi of ODA. Pressure is growing both within Korea 
and internationally to increase South Korea’s emphasis on poverty reduction 
through increased allocations to LDCs, as well as enhance the aid volumes 
and aid practices commensurate with the country’s influence in the economic 
realm.78 Whether, and how, South Korea chooses to do so will have significant 
repercussions on aid strategies throughout the world.                PEAR
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